The British Invasion of the Gulf 1809 – 1820 and the
Trucial State System
The major study of British imperialism in the
Gulf is J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (Kelly J. B., 1968) followed by his
study of the 20th century.
Kelly opens his work with a descriptive geographical history of the Gulf
and its key port towns and ruling families and dynasties during this
period. He treats our southern region of
the eastern coast of the Gulf as part of the broader historical place of Oman
prior to the British division of the Trucial States of the western portion of
al-Shammal and the peninsula extending downward from Hormuz and outward toward
Abu Dhabi. The British through their
East India Company also attempted to open a factory at Basrah in negotiations
with the Ottomans. However a plague at
Basrah in 1773 and a Persian invasion and temporary occupation of Basrah forced
the British to withdraw from it in 1779. The Dutch meanwhile were forced to withdraw
entirely from the Persian Gulf by about 1766.
Thereafter Bushire became the center of administrative operations for
the English East India Company in the Gulf.
The motivations for the British invasion of the
Gulf and particularly the sheikhdoms stretching between Abu Dhabi and Ras
al-Khaimah, and the territories of greater Oman is a matter of serious dispute
and debate among historians. The British
school of historiography sees this as an attempt by Britain to limit local Arab
piracy and raids on British and Indian merchant ships belonging to the East
India Company that operated through the Gulf from their base in India. According to the British historian J.B. Kelly
the trucial system had its origins in the early 19th century to end
piracy and maritime warfare . The truces
or peace treaties forced or imposed on the various sheikhs and sheikdoms and tribes along the coast was imposed to
impose a British mandated order over the territory. According to the terms of the treaties no
sheikhdom could impose itself or make deals for land or treaties with other
countries or political entities without consulting or going through the British (Kelly J. B., 1980, pp. 53-54). This view has been refuted in part by Sheikh
Dr. Sultan Al Qassimi’s meticulous studies of this period, in which he shows
the British invasion was a takeover of the Gulf trade. The British invented or made up a myth about
piracy among the Qawasim and other Arab seamen to justify their invasion (Qassimi, The
Myth of Piracy in the Gulf, 1986). Indeed the Qawasim had been able to attack
and seize several British vessels in the Gulf, including the 8-gun armed ship
the Sylph in October 1808 (Kelly J. B., 1968, pp. 112-3).
There were other motivations and complications
to the British invasion, destruction of port towns and defenses, ships, along
the Southern and Eastern Gulf from the late 18th to early 19th
century. The British favored the
Sultanate of Oman and Muscat as a base for operations into the wider Gulf. In so doing the British were wary of growing
Wahhabi power and influence arising out of central Arabia and the Nejd toward
the coast and against the Sultan of Oman.
Various reports of the British note the presence of Wahhabi preachers
and advocates in Muscat during this period.
The British were also aware of the relative influence and success of the
Wahhabis and their military and diplomatic pressure on the coastal Arab
sheikhdoms including at Ras al-Khaimah (also known as Julfar in older
sources). A British military officer
Captain Seton was sent to Muscat in January 1809 where he noted that the
Qawasim were patrolling the main shipping lanes at the same time that a Wahhabi
vice-regent, Husain ibn ‘Ali was demanding tribute or payment of money from
Bombay for the entry of British ships into the Gulf (Kelly J. B.,
1968, p. 115). At the same time the Wahhabis had rallied
their military pressure against the coasts behind the able military command of
Mutlaq al-Mutairi.
Confronted with
the changing alignment of the Eastern Gulf, the British mobilized the cruiser
Mornington and sent back its former Resident David Seton to Muscat to seek
Omani support against the Qawasim. The
British were taking sides in the regional division and seeking to use the
Omanis against the Qawasim. A temporary
agreement in 1805 negotiated by Seton saw the return of the English ship, the
Trimmer and a resumption of permit for the Qasimi ships to call at ports in
India.
Over the next year the British through their
administrative agents in Bushire on the Persian coast, and at Bombay where the
British East India Company (EIC) was based decided to mobilize for a military
campaign against the Qawasim and the other coastal sheikhdoms that were not
allied with the Omani Sultan. The
British deliberately sided with the Sultan of Oman to use a combination of Britsh
and Muscat based Omani troops against the coastal sheikdhoms.
The arrangement
was only temporary for the British backing the Oman Sultanate based in Muscat
were intent on maintaining pressure through the Eastern Gulf past the areas of
Qassimi shipping. After the seizure by
Qassimi ships of the East India company’s cruiser Sylph in October 1808, which
led to the killing of much of its crew and passengers, a crisis was further
engendered by British policy makers based in Bombay and India. By September 1809 the British ordered a large
fleet to sail against Ras al-Khaimah and attack the main port city of the
Qawasim. A fleet of
large naval forces and detachments of marines, infantry and artillery left
Bombay on September 14, 1809 and arrived in in Muscat on October 3.
On November 13,
1809 the British landed a battalion of
marines. The Qawasim fought intensely
from their houses and were only driven from them when the British set fire to
them. The use of heavy bombardment by
the British forced the abandonment of the town.
The British suffered about 20 casualties, with an estimate of 80 dead
and many more probably wounded among the residents of Ras al Khaimah and its
defenders but we don’t really know for sure the total loss and devastation on
the civilians. The British burned all of
the towns’s vessels. By next morning the
sacking of the city was complete and the British abandoned and left by sea (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 118).
Figure 5 The British Attack on Ras al-Khaimah November 13, 1809
Figure 6 The British Burn the City and Fleets of Ral Al-Khaimah
November 13, 1809
From there the
British attacked and devastated the ports of Lingah and Luft where the losses
among both sides were about equal .
These scenes were recreated in a series of lithograph prints some time
later. The stiffest resistance to the
British land and sea forces was at Shinas where despite the combined forces of
the British and Omanis from Muscat, the so-called Wahhabi and Qasimi forces
resisted bravely throughout the day against superior firepower.
Figure 7
The Attack on Luft by the British in 1809
By December 7,
the British fleet with its British and Muscat troops had arrived back at Muscat
where both the British and Sa`id the Sultan of Muscat were confident in their
success of destroying and attacking the Qawasim and the coastal sheikhdoms and
towns to their West (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 119). Still they met resistance from other port
towns, notably at Shinas where Wahhabi forces sent by Mutlaq had entrenched
themselves into a fort. The British and
Muscati troops were forced to launch an infantry assault with vicious
hand-to-hand combat and loss of life on both sides. The Wahhabi-Qassimi forces threatened to
fight literally to almost the last man, and rather than surrender. Eventually a truce was brokered and the survivors
were allowed to surrender on honorable terms.
In military history if one were to compare these sorts of battles the
closest analogy I can think of is the Battle for the Alamo in Texas in 1832
fought between Mexican and American forces.
In the
following months the British resumed pressure along the coastal regions and proceeded
with a fleet to put pressure on the regions around Qatar, Bahrain and
Kuwait. In Qatar, the figure of Rahmah
ibn Jabbar was seen as a leader of local attacks against British shipping
interests and so was targeted for attack.
The aim of the British was to cut off any alliance between Rahmah and
the Qawasim (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 122).
By 1811 British
and Omani relations had deteriorated but meanwhile Amir Sa’ud had allowed his
sons to launch a landing of Wahhabi troops at Ajman and march inland to
Buraima. When they were attacked by
local tribesmen while en route they were rescured by Mutlaq al-Mutairi.
From there the Wahhabis launched an attack into the Eastern hajar up to
Ras al-Hadd, far to the East of Muscat.
Apparently Sa`ud was displeased with his sons aggressive attacks rather
diplomacy and ordered that they curtail these attacks and shift their focus
back on reinforcing Wahhabi presence in Oman (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 124).
In the
following decade internal political events and the ordering of Ottoman forces
under the command of the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali and his sons who invaded
the Hejaz in 1811 curtailed a Wahhabi political success on the coast. In 1814, Amir Sa`ud died and was succeeded by
his son ‘Abdullah Sa`ud who had to face the invasion of the Nejd interior by
Muhammad Ali’s forces. This left the
Gulf shores’ sheikhdoms to themselves to negotiate or deal with British
pressure that was placed on them. Tensions
remained and flared out on November 28, 1814 when the British and Qawasim
exchanged gunfire against each other at Ras al Khaimah forcing the British to
sail off. It is reported crowds of Arabs
onshore shouted, jeered and shouted as they fired their muskets at the British (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 134). The continued semi-autonomy of Qassimi
shipping in these years caused the British to intervene militarily again. In 1816 they again bombarded Ras al Khaimah.
In February 1817 Qassimi sailors surprised and took a British gunboat, killed
17 of her crew and kept 8 prisoners that they took to Ras al-Khaimah. In response the British sent two warships to
Ras Al Khaimah. The defeat of Wahhabi
forces in the Nejd by the Egyptian forces under
Ibrahim forced the withdrawal of Wahhabi support for the coast and left
the Qassimis alone. Now in the
intervening years the residents of Ras al-Khaimah strengthened their
fortifications and when the British invaded again at the end of 1819 they found
stiff resistance.
Figure 8 Map of the
Expansion of Wahhabi and Saudi power and influence 1745-1816. The map does not include Wahhabi led raids
and commercial ties into lower Iraq and Kuwait during this same period. Source: Wikipedia entry on Wahhabism.
Contemporary Arab historians and
chroniclers who lived during the rise of the Wahhabi movement which received
the support of ibn Saud were divided in their opinions about the claims and
goals of the movement. Some like ibn
Ghanim were highly supportive of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas and of his followers
who claimed to be Salafis or original followers of Islamic doctrine. Others however who sided with the political
opponents of Wahhabism were openly critical of these claims (Fattah, 1997, pp. 46-47).
This Wahhabi and Muhammad ibn Saud
expansion led to the formation of what is regarded as the first Saudi state
that formed in central Arabia and which by the early 1800s had spread toward
the Gulf coast and into the Hejaz. For a
brief period of about 8 years it held power over the Hejaz and the cities of
Mecca and Medina. This lasted until the
Ottomans ordered the Egyptian led military campaigns under Muhammad Ali,
Egypt’s ruler and his sons Tusun and Ibrahim.
The resulting Wahhabi-Egyptian wars lasted from August 1811 to 1818 and
resulted in the restoration of Ottoman
control of the Hejaz and of Mecca and Medina.
By Janaury 1813 the Egyptian-Ottoman armies had retaken Mecca and
Medina. The armies of Muhammad Ali and
his son Ibrahim Pasha destroyed a number of towns in the Najd of Central Arabia
including Dara’iya but it did not gain power over this area which remained
autonomous or free of Ottoman rule through World War I. The choice then of the Hejaz based sharifs of
Mecca to leave the Najd alone and allow it to develop freely from Sharif’s and
Ottoman control is of interest to us. It
seems the rise of the House of Saud was a result of its more responsive
understanding of the needs of the townspeople of the Najd and Central Arabia
during this period (Fattah, 1999,
p. 48).
During the Egyptian-Ottoman
campaigns against ‘Abdullah ibn Sa`ud and his forces, Amir Sa`ud sent a Wahhabi
diplomat to the British. The British
rejected a formal agreement with Amir Sa`ud but kept some non-commital
diplomatic discussion. The British in
1812 and 1813 began cruising the Gulf searching for Qawasim ships to attack and
destroy (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 129). Meanwhile Saiyid
Sa`id the ruler of Oman based in Muscat informed the British and their agents
in Bombay that he was going to move on Ras al-Khaimah to restore power to the
former ruler Sultan ibn Saqr who had been deposed by the Wahhabi’s five years
ealier. This attempt failed however,
although Sultan ibn Saqr did gain possession of Sharjah. By late 1814 some Qassimi dhows appeared off
the northern coasts of India probably in attempts to restore their trade. To the British this was viewed as a rival to
their goal of domination of the Gulf trade and ports. The British historian J.B. Kelly has
suggested that contemporary documents showed the British were in effect
understanding that the Qawasim were in effect to be recognized as a power that
was able to conduct international relations whether with local sultanates in
India or elsewhere. The British were not
in favor of giving such recognition and the label of piracy was one way the
British could attempt to deter and delegitimize the state and status of Qassimi
sheikhdoms at the time (Kelly J. B., 1968, pp. 130-31)[1]. Nevertheless by 1816 the Qawasim ships were
attacking European vessels in the Gulf including an American ship, Persia
that may have been trading in slaves.
The British agents in the region resorted to racist and other derogatory
language in describing the populace and rulers of Ras al-Khaimah, which had
revived from the initial attack by the British in 1809. In one encounter in 1816 the Qassimi ships’
cannons managed to damage and force the British commander of the ship, Vestal
to break off the engagement and flee, while the locals cheered from the
shoreline at Ras al-Khaimah (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 134).[2] These military campaigns and alleged piracy
also do not appear to have cost any real loss in local shipping. Bahrain authorities and merchants appeared to
have cooperated or supported the Qawasim naval engagements against British and
other foreign ships, for trade to India was kept intact during this period (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 137).
By 1818 however, the British were
able to raise additional troops from India because some local wars there had
ended, the Mahratta and Pindari Wars (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 138). This was the same year that Ibrahim Pasha,
the son of Muhammad Ali had finished his bloody assault on Dara`iya in the
Nejd. In late December of 1819, the
British struck again at Ras al-Khaimah in the second attack in a decade. Despite fierce fighting from the Qawasim at
Ras al-Khaimah, the British broke the defenses and sacked the town and
destroyed all the major ships they could find.
On January 8, 1820 the British Commander, Keir forced a peace treaty
with the local ruler Hasan ibn Rahmah.
The Establishment of the British System and the Trucial States: 1820-1920
On January 20, 1820 an agreement was
signed between the British and the shaykhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, umm
al-Qawain, Bahrain and the Qasimis in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaima (Rogan, 2012, p. 176). It became known as the General Treaty of Peace with the Arab Tribes. It was from this agreement that the term the
Trucial States or states of the peace or truce is derived. In return the Qawasim were to be allowed to
resume limited trade with India but acts of piracy were outlawed. The British would have absolute powers to
inspect Qawasim shipping and to limit the size of their vessels after they had
already destroyed most of their fleet.
The British also required that all ships be registered with the British
and permission obtained before sailing.
The British also banned the import of shipbuilding quality timber or
wood from India. They were deliberately
trying to stifle and limit shipbuilding among the Qawasim merchants and
shipbuilders. Further the British denied the restoration to power of Sultan ibn
Saqr as ruler of Ras al-Khaimah (Kelly J. B., 1968, p. 159).
Throughout the 1820s the British
policy was aimed at extending their influence and control of Gulf trade by
gaining more power over the Gulf towns.
As Iran was an independent state, Britain sought to gain direct power over
the Arab towns and sheikhdoms of the Gulf.
The British in part realized but also in part imagined that their empire
and control of these waterways was greater in power that it actually was. The attempt to secure control of ocean based
trade and ports was a part of British imperial policy to dominate world trade
under a 19th century concept of Pax Britannica under which the Arabian Gulf was to become a
British protectorate. Exactly what the
British assumed they were protecting was vague and some historians might now
call this their imagined empire. The
British sought this control as way of countering the presence and expansion of
the land based Ottoman Empire that held Iraq and parts of the Hejaz in
Arabia. Eventually Kuwait would join
this British Gulf protectorate in 1899 and later Qatar would join in 1916 (Rogan, 2012, p. 176).
During this long century, it was the
British navy’s decision in 1907 to convert from coal to oil that would have
immediate effect on British policy toward the Gulf. This decision was emphasized directly by the
then Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill who announced this new dependence
on oil to the British Parliament in 1913.
In 1908 the first oil reserves were found and explored in Iran. Thereafter a search for additional oil
reserves was underway and over the next decades all of the various sheikhdoms
would grant the British oil companies rights to explore for oil in exchange for
royalties and payments that would subsidize each of the local rulers (Rogan, 2012, pp. 176-77).
Meanwhile the rise of Abd al-Azizi
ib Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa’ud, better known as Ibn Saud, (1880-1953) in
Central Arabia became a major political force in the region. In 1902 he had defeated his rivals the
Rashidi clan in a civil war, and by 1913 he had conquered Eastern Arabia and
the coast around al-Qatif and Hufuf. As
a result the Saud-Wahhabi confederation had now established itself as another
of the Gulf Sheikhdoms or local powers.
All of these developments led to a series of complicated maneuvers both
politically and militarily as World War I broke out in 1914. While the Ottomans initially sought a
political arrangement with Ibn Saud to seek their help against British presence
during the war, in 1915 the British also negotiated their own treaty that
recognized Ibn Saud’s authority over central and eastern Arabia. In return Ibn Saud began receiving monthly
payments and guns from Britain, but in reality
Ibn Saud remained neutral during the First World War and refused to
attack the Ottomans with whom he also had diplomatic relations.
Thereafter the decision of the
elderly Sharif Husayn of Mecca to create a military alliance with Britain to
attack the Ottomans form their base in the Hejaz allowed Ibn Saud to maneuver
against the Hashemite dynasty of Sharif Husayn.
While Sharif Husayn’s sons and the tribes of the Hejaz joined in the
British campaign, this is the famous Arab Revolt of the Lawrence of Arabia
saga, ibn Saud was able to position himself to launch pressure and attacks
against Sharif Husayn’s position and against the Hashemite dynasty in the
Hejaz. Sharif Husayn may a number of
blunders including the refusal to allow any of Ibn Saud’s loyal forces, the
Ikhwan to enter Mecca during the time of the Hajj or on other visits.
Other Regional Resistance to European Invasions
The Wahhabi-Saudi movement in Arabia was not the only source
of resistance to the European invasions of the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Seas.
After 1676 the Zaidi movement in Yeent began to occupy the commercial plains
and coastlands and towns like Zabid, Mukha, al-Hudeida and Aden (al-Naqeeb, 1990, p. 41). In addition the Ibadi movement continued in
around Muscat under the Bu Sa’idiyah Imamate while the Ghafiri – Hinnawi
struggle started in 1718 (al-Naqeeb, 1990, p. 41). One of the first historians to note the
sectarian division of the Arabian Peninsula as dating from the 18th
century was Amin al-Rihani, who noted the rivalry between the Qhatan tribes of
Southern Yemen and the Northern ‘Adnani tribes.
Together we find a division and overlap of interests between southern
regions in Oman and Yemen and the northern and central Arabian towns and
tribes.
·
The result was the
emergence of Muscat as a regional commercial power after 1719, which the
British in particular would pay attention to.
o
The Ya’aribah Ibadi Imamate
in Oman was able to attack and pursue Portuguese fleets and possessions after
the destruction of Hormuz. Sultan ibn
Sayf (1649-1668) was able to besiege Mombasa ion the East African Coast. His successors captured Mombasa in 198 and Zanabar and
repeatedly attacked Diu and Gujarat in India, and annexed Bahrain, and the
island of Qishm in the Arabian Gulf.
·
Some areas of Yemen,
notably Aden and the Hadramawt separated from Zaidi Yemn in about 17228.
·
The Persian Nadir Shah
attempted to invade the Arabian Gulf and Peninsula in 17476 to end foreign
influence.
·
Kuwait arose a s a
commercial port and center after about 1752 under the Al-Sabah family.
·
The Qasimis or Qawasim
became a regional power of resistance from about 1777.
·
Bahrain became a commercial
center after about 1783 on der the Al-Khalifa.
·
Al-Saud assumed leadership
of the Wahhabi movement after 1792.
·
Kuwait’s increasing
importance relative to Basrah starts in about 1792 as a result of wars between
the Ottomans and Persians. (al-Naqeeb, 1990, pp. 42-43)
It was during the late 18th century that Oman
becomes divided between a Sultanate that controlled Muscat and an Imamate that
had influence on the interior. This
division was caught up between the rivalry between the northern Sunni Ghafiri
tribes and the Hinnawi. As Wahhabi
influence grew from Central Arabia southward the rise of the Muṭawi’ah or religious men
found among the Ibadi, became prominent during this period as a new type of
cleric or intellectual (al-Naqeeb, 1990, p. 45).
It was just as these divisions and developments were taking
place that the Qasimis became important along the area of the Trucial Coast of
what was then Western and Northern Oman, but now known as the United Arab
Emirates. When Sar ibn Rashid took
leadership in 1777, the Qasimis entered into a struggle with the Al Bū Sa’id that lasted through
the British invasions of 1809-1820.
For the British their strategy was to side with the
Sultanate of Oman against the new up and comers like the Qassimis and the Wahhabis. The new prestige and indeed naval power and
presence of the Qassimis in the Arabian Gulf provoked the decision of the
British to attack them and to break up their potential alliance with the
Wahhabis who were expanding to the coastal areas.
[1]
The key document referred to by Kelly is [India Office (I.O.)] Bombay Secret
Proceedings, vol. 41, Consuln. 29 of 21 July 1819, Moria to Nepean, 20 Apr.
1815.
[2]
[I.O.] Persia and P. Gulf, vol. 32, Gov.-in-Council to Court, Bombay Castle, 9
Oct. 1819, and Buckingham, ii. 373-6, as cited in Kelly (op cit.).
