The British Retreat from the Arabian Gulf
By 30 October 1967 the British had sent Goronwy Roberts a leading diplomat from the
Foreign Office ot the Gulf to inform the various local rulers of the British
decision to abandon their political engagement in the Gulf (Kelly J. B.,
1980, p. 61). At the time Britain was facing a severe
economic crisis. The value of the British pound sterling had dropped and this
in part forced large cuts in public spending. On 9 January Roberts met with the
rulers of the Trucial States and informed them of the British decision to
withdraw from the Gulf. The cost of
maintaining British troops in the Gulf was estimated to cost about £12 million per year. Although the ruling Sheikhs of the oil
producing sheikhdoms of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Qater offered to pay or
to supplement the cost of maintaining British support. But the British would refuse this offer for a
variety of complex reasons germane to British domestic and foreign influences.
The trucial system that had been in place since the 1820s
when the British invaded the Gulf in their claim to end piracy and protection of
maritime trade. The various peace
agreements or truces that were forced along the southern shore of the Gulf from
Abu Dhabi to Ras al-Khaimah required the local authorities or shaikhs to keep
peace among themselves during the annual season for pearling and fishing. In
exchange Britain would patrol the Gulf and keep the peace at sea. In effect, the British were exerting greater
control over the scale of trade and monopolized the routes of trade by
requiring permits to be paid for. In
addition the British required and directed all trade to Bushire, Bahrain or Indian coast ports under their control. By the 1880s and 1890s further agreement were
in place that required Bahrain and the Trucial States to relinquish or give up
all direct foreign negotiations and border claims to British decision
making. This was an act of imperialism
that extended the British Empire’s command and control of important sea ports
and trading areas.
By February of 1968 the idea of a Federation of Arab
Emirates, that would include the Trucial States, Qatar and Bahrain had been
discussed in formal diplomatic talks. Meanwhile the Shah of Iran whose
country’s wealth and military were a force in the region expressed concern
against such a federation or alliance.
The Shah’s mere threats whether voiced or implied would later present
difficulty over the next few years. The
Shah claimed a historical claim over Bahrain as a one-time Iranian
province. While such claims were dubious
it nevertheless presented the very real threat of intervention and opposition
by the Shah of Iran to a wider Federation for the Southern Gulf (Kelly J. B., 1980, p. 71). The resulting pressure played a role in
splitting the Federation into smaller units so that only the Trucial States and
not Qatar and Bahrain would be consolidated into the new formed United Arab
Emirates at the end of 1971. The Shah of
Iran also used his military forces amid the interval of transition into the
formation of the UAE to occupy the Tunb islands off of Ras al-Khaimah. The Shah’s seizure of the Tunb islands was
apparently done with the tacit approval of the British who in the waning months
before their formal departure from the Gulf did nothing to stop the Shah.
Oil, Development and International Politics of the Arab World
In
the 1970s oil became a major force in Arab economic development. The geography and location of oil was however
uneven. Some largely populated or older
countries, like Egypt, Lebanon , Jordan and Syria, had little or no oil, while
other countries possessed vast reserves of oil deposits.
The
first significant discoveries of oil in the Arab world occurred in the late 1920s
and 1930s, primarily in Saudi Arabia and the upper Gulf region. This enabled Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
for instance to begin to grow infrastructures and connections with Western oil
companies to exploit their oil deposits.
The earliest oil discoveries and concessions to explore oil occurred in
Iran in 1908 and Iraq in 1927. The upper
Gulf region was successfully explored for oil in 1931. At this time there was a reliance on British
and American oil companies to explore for oil, and so Standard Oil of
California made its first discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932, while CalTex
(later known as Texaco) struck oil in Kuwait in 1938 and finally Standard Oil
of California found significant reserves in Eastern Saudi Arabia in 1938 (Rogan, 2012, p. 447). These discoveries proved especially important
for the Western Allies of Britain and the United States when World War II broke
out just a year later, as both countries needed oil for their navies. There is also much discussion among
historians that a significant reason for both Japan’s and Germany’s aggressive
expansion and occupation of new territories in Asia and in Europe was out of a
need to obtain oil supplies.
The
original formula for these Western oil companies was for them to pay a limited
amount of royalties to the host nation from which they extracted the oil but to
keep the profits for themselves. During
the decades of the 1940s-1970s, this formula made Standard Oil, Texaco, Mobil,
British Petroleum and other oil companies enormous profits, wealth and
power. It led to a massive investment
and expansion of their interests to control all phases of oil from its initial
extraction out of the ground, to its shipping, its refinement and ultimately
its sale in retail. It was a kind of
shared monopoly among the seven most prominent oil companies, including Shell
Oil. By the 1950s the oil producing
states exerted demands for greater control and forced the formation of a joint
operative company that would be under Saudi auspices and control. This company was named ARAMCO and was a
jointly operated venture between Exxon (formerly Standard Oil of New Jersey)
and Chevron (formerly Standard Oil of California), and Texaco, and Mobil. It is revealing to note however that in this
period the amount of taxes paid to the US government by these four oil
companies was greater in this period than all of the revenues paid to the Saudi
government (Rogan, 2012, p. 448).
Other
new oil producing countries outside of the Arab world were receiving better
margins. For instance, Venezuela, the
major Latin American oil producing country, had negotiated a 50:50 division of
oil returns in concessions made with the oil companies in 1943. It was not until 1950 that Saudi Arabia
finally obtained a similar rate. This
50:50 formula remained intact until the oil crisis of 1973 While the United States had long been an oil
producer, it was also a major oil importer as its consistent demand exceeded
its production. Europe which had little or no oil was also a major importer and
market for oil produced in the Arab countries.
Eventually other oil producing nations also arose, including the Soviet
Union, Indonesia and Nigeria who became major oil exporters for the world
market. Oil was also discovered and
began to explored in Algeria in 1956 and in Libya in 1959. Libya alone chose to reward oil contracts to
independent oil companies under the assumption they would be more efficient,
resilient and would pay more for their rights to extract oil (Rogan, 2012,
p. 451).
Two
wars changed the outlook of oil producing countries in the Arab world. These were the 1967 War in which Israel
aggressively seized Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, and seized the
entire Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza territories. This effectively rendered Palestinians who
lived in these lands under Jordanian or Egyptian domain as occupied residents
of an illegal Israeli occupation. The
1967 defeat also spelled a major blow to the continuity and development of the
Nasser government in Egypt, that ruled Egypt since 1952. The seizure of the Sinai and the presence of
Israeli troops along the eastern half of the Suez Canal also threatened the
stability of oil shipments by tanker through the Suez Canal to Europe. The lasting effect and threat of expansion of
war led to the October War of 1973, in which Anwar Sadat, the President of
Egypt ordered the crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces and the seizure
of the Sinai Peninsula. Although the
eventual counterattack by Israel led to the reconquest of the Sinai, as well as
a long and protracted battle for control of the Golan Heights in Syria, it is
the following diplomatic stance by the Arab countries that became significant
after October of 1973. An excellent
documentary series on the aftermath of the war and its diplomacy is found here.
The
1967 War also affected developments in Libya where in 1969 a coup was launched
by Col. Qadhafi and other members of the military against King Idris I of
Libya. Qadhafi an avowed socialist but
also a supporter of Arab unity, considered himself an heir to Gamal Abdul
Nasser, the President of Egypt who died in 1970. Qadhafi moved quickly to force major
concessions from one of the independent oil companies that operated in Libya
and gained a rise in oil prices and a new concession of 55:45 thus breaking the
50:50 formula that had prevailed (Rogan, 2012).
It
was also in these intervening years between the two wars, that the Gulf states
emerged with full independence from British protection or presence that had
been around since about 1820. As of 1968
there were still nine Gulf states under technical protection of the
British. These were; Bahrain; Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah,
Ras al-Khaima, Um al-Qiwain, Fujayra and ‘Ajman. Internal economic crises also forced
Britain’s disengagement from the Gulf region and it accelerated the forces of
state formation and union that resulted in the United Arab Emirates and the
separate formation of Qatar and Bahrain. There were however diplomatic
challenges in resolving the problems of Iranian claims to the islands of the
Arabian Gulf, as well as the claims of the Shah of Iran to Bahrain itself.
In
the immediate aftermath of the 1973 war, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and other
Arab members of OPEC the Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries, met and issued an
ultimatum and a boycott of shipment of oil as a protest against Israel’s
actions and occupation. This forced a
major rise in the price of oil worldwide as massive shortages ensued. It also forced the Western governments to
pressure Israel to accept a diplomatic initiative from President Sadat of
Egypt. These were the Camp David
Accords, that provided for the return of Sinai to Egypt and the restoration of
shipping in the Suez Canal. In response
to the 1973 war, Arab oil producing states were successful in achieving a
significant increase in oil prices and in the percentages of their own control
of profits and to take increased ownership of their own resources, refining,
distribution and financing.
Iraq: 1958-1978
Between 1958 and 1979, Iraq
underwent a complicated history that saw a republican movement absorbed within
a military dictatorship. In July 1958 a
military coup, led by General ‘Abdul Karim Qassim, launched a military strike
and killed the king and the long-time loyalist Prime Nuri al-Said. In one quick blow the constitutional monarchy
that had been in place in Iraq since 1924 was replaced by a military
declaration of the new Republic of Iraq.
The new government announced an implemented national development plans
that sought to use the new oil revenues to promote education and
infrastructure. Among these plans was
land reform law that forced redistribution of land to peasants that by 1971
resulted in substantial improvements in land ownership by poorer farming
families (Abdullah, 2003, p. 160). Despite this the real push for development
was urbanization and the expansion of services paid for by the expanding
national oil revenues. Within a year
however serious opposition arose from the ranks of the influential Ba’ath Party
and in 1959 attempts at assassinations and military coups (including a failed
attempt by the young Saddam Hussein) showed the limits of the new military
government (Abdullah, 2003, p. 163). The Ba’athists were a political party that
originated in Syria and that fused liberal ideas of freedom with
socialism. When Qasim threatened to
annex Kuwait in 1961, Britain mobilized politically and granted Kuwait full
independence. In 1962 ‘Abdul Salam ‘Arif
and other officers led a military coup that toppled Qasim. ‘Arif and his brother ruled from a relatively
weak position and encountered regional resistance from Iraqi Kurds. Behind the scenes two military officers from
the town of Tikrit consolidated and reorganized the Ba’ath Party. These were Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam
Hussein who in 1968 were able to mount another military coup that toppled
‘Arif’s government and placed them into power.
By this time nationalization of the oil sector had been completed and
the rich southern fields brought into full production. National development was remarkable on a
number of fronts, including the dramatic rise in literacy and the granting of
free education and success in promoting women’s education. Yet serious conflicts continued and the
expansion of security services and internal repression resulted in overly
consolidated state power and in 1978 a campaign against the Kurds was waged
that resulted in destruction of man of their villages and displacement. By 1979 Al-Bakr resigned, claiming poor
health, to allow Saddam Hussein to take full control of the Iraqi government
and the Ba’ath Party. The dictatorship
of Saddam Hussein was now begun and total in its power.
Saddam Hussein and Iraq 1979-2003
The seizure of power in 1979 by
Saddam Hussein led to an intense personality cult promoted by the state in the
media and in the schools. As Saddam
Hussein’s rise to power coincided with the Iranian Revolution, the real
opposition to the Baath Party came from the Shi’i population. The chief opposition now was the Shia
population whose leader Ayatollah Sadr and his sister were arrested and killed
by the state. Soon however, the rivalry
with Iran over territory and control of the lower waterways of the Shatt
al-Arab led to an announcement of war by Saddam Hussein against Iraq.
The first of
the regional Gulf wars may be considered to be the long Iran-Iraq War that
lasted during most of the 1980s. This
war was launched by President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who after a series of
border skirmishes and air attacks in early September of 1980, ordered up
thousands of reserves for the Iraqi army and ordered an invasion of Iran by
some 45,000 Iraqi troops. Saddam claimed the reason for the invasion was to
reclaim territory within Iran in which Iranians of Arab heritage lived. When he attacked into Iranian territory it
provoked a prolonged series of counterattacks and air bombardments by both
sides. The war would stop for some
periods and then resume and both sides faced difficult conditions in fighting
from trenches and in the southern cities of Iran, including Khorramshahr, and
passageways of the lower Gulf waterways between Iran and Iraq (Axworthy,
2013). The Iranians had air superiority and much
better trained air force, while on the ground both forces were about
equal. When the war spread to Kurdistan
in the north of Iraq, the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces was also a dangerous
and questionable tactic during the war.
It was this use that gave the direct evidence for putting Saddam Hussein
on trial for war crimes after his capture during the Second Gulf War of 2003. In the end both sides agreed to a truce and
an end to conflict in 1988.
The Invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the First Gulf War of 1991 and Allied Invasion of Iraq in 2003
Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 was not only a violation of international law that
upholds national sovereignty but it was also to a large degree motivated by
internal crisis within Iraq. The end of
the Iran-Iraq war had been costly to Iraq’s economy and with over 500,000
soldiers still in uniform about to be released there was a general problem with
unemployment in Iraq with the stagnation of the economy (Abdullah,
2003). The result of the invasion and occupation of
Kuwait in 1990 was the formation of an international alliance or coalition that
included the GCC countries, the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and
numerous other countries. On January 16,
1991 a massive air assault on Iraq initiated the land, air and sea attacks to
liberate Kuwait and eventually into Southern Iraq. While the assault succeeded in freeing Kuwait
and restoring its ruling family to power, and it also succeeded in destroying
Iraqi air power and much of its land force, there were notable shortcomings and
failures. The failure of the Coalition led by President Bush of the United
States to authorize a full invasion of Iraq enabled Saddam Hussein to remain in
power. When an uprising among the Shi’a
population in the South was at first encouraged by the Allies but then
abandoned to itself it allowed Saddam Hussein to use his remaining ground forces
to suppress and brutally put down the opposition around Basra.
Although in the aftermath of Kuwait
and the First Gulf War severe international sanctions were put in place against
Iraq, Saddam Hussein would remain in full power for another 12 years until the
Second Gulf War of 2003. The Allied coalition of 2003 led by the United States with significant British participation, along with other allied nations was ordered without a United Nations referendum. The ten-year invasion and occupation of Iraq that toppled the regime and dictatorship of Saddam Hussein is now recognized as destablizing the entire country of Iraq. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair admitted to the disastrous results of his policies in an interview in the Fall of 2015. The role of these allied coalitions as effective international policemen for the region is a complex topic for historians as it they functioned as armies where the GCC and local countries lack adequate military manpower.
